Chemical Process Safety (PSM/RMP)
Not all "simple asphyxiants" are created equal; thus, not all make for good purging or blanketing. Would you believe me if I told you that one very common simple asphyxiant gas should NEVER be used for purging or blanketing flammable atmospheres? Many folks view Nitrogen (N2) and Carbon Dioxide (CO2) as very similar. This is based on how we, as humans, respond to both of these gases. CO2 has been getting a lot of attention lately due to its increasing use in the food and beverage retail industry and industrial refrigeration. It has some great qualities for its intended uses, but it comes with a significantly increased risk to workers who normally do not work around hazardous chemicals. Membership Content
Some of the more eye-opening revisions:
Here is a summary of all the new requirements:
At 7:30 p.m. on July 2, 2021, Employee #1, Employee #2, and Employee #3 performed two maintenance tasks in the M2 crude rectification section on the ground and second levels at tower M2-T250 and vessel V-207. On July 2, 2021, during the night shift, three (3) gas monomer chemical operators were exposed to toxic fluorocarbons and other hazardous chemicals while performing the maintenance tasks at M2-T250, which resulted in delayed respiratory failure. When returning T250 to normal operations, three employees were exposed to unknown and known acute toxic chemicals, due to inadequate safe work practices and respiratory protection, identified as expected to be in the process streams such as, but not limited to:
A Health and Safety Executive (HSE) investigation into a gasoline overfill of a carbon adsorption vapor recovery unit (VRU) revealed concerns with the VRU's design. The overfill prevention system was NOT INDEPENDENT of the basic process control system (BPCS). When the BPCS failed, the overfill prevention system also failed. This resulted in loss of containment, and risked a significant fire and explosion, as well as extensive environmental damage.
A boiler maker, 36, suffered fatal burns after an explosion occurred at a refinery. A contractor employed the victim and two injured co-workers at the facility. The three employees were hospitalized as a result of the explosion. The victim died four days later from burns over approximately 90% of his body. The events occurred in the area of the South Flare and Knock-Out Drum (KO Drum). A 36-inch pipe delivers hydrocarbons from the refinery production area and collects them in the KO Drum. Another 36-inch pipe exits the top of the KO Drum and delivers vapors to be burned at the South Flare to relieve pressure from the production area. The process leading up to the fatality began when, during a turnaround (shut down for maintenance), an environmental project was begun to capture flare gas and re-use it as fuel or feedstock rather than burn the gas in the flare. The 36-inch pipe between the KO Drum and the South Flare would be altered by installing a bypass allowing the South Flare to remain in service while work was performed at the KO Drum and the Flare Gas Recovery System. To begin the recovery project, the KO Drum and Flare Gas Recovery System had to be isolated from the South Flare and piping to the flare. Three contractor employees climbed onto the catwalk above the South Flare KO Drum at the 36-inch diameter outlet pipe. Their job was to open the pipe flange, insert a pipe blind, and close the flange.
On October 19, 2019, @ 07:15 a.m., a contractor employee was standing on a scissor lift and replacing insulation on the pipes in the engine room of Building 3. As the employee lowered the scissor lift, the walking platform of the scissor lift where a technician was standing struck the service drain valve (3ML 3064) and cracked the nipple at the thread, causing an uncontrolled release of pressurized anhydrous ammonia. |
Partner Organizations
I am proud to announce that The Chlorine Institute and SAFTENG have extended our"Partners in Safety" agreement for another year (2024) CI Members, send me an e-mail to request your FREE SAFTENG membership
Member Associations
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