Episode 122 - Bryan Haywood - Permit and Non-Permit Required Confined Spaces
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Episode 127 - Bryan Haywood - Confined Space - Atmospheric Monitoring
My visual of how I facilitate PHA(s)
Facilitating Process Hazard(s) Analysis (PHA) is one of my favorite process safety skills. From having the honor to be the author of Part II in the CCPS's Hazard Evaluation Techniques (3rd Edition) to working with several software companies on the development of their PHA products, there is nothing better than facilitating an actual PHA with a talented team of Engineers, EHS professionals, Operators, and Maintenance personnel. In every one of my PHAs, I explain the process using this simple PREVENT-PROTECT-MITIGATE model. I then challenge the team to identify the safeguards they have in place that fit into these three (3) layers of protection for each scenario studied. Last week I shared a fun exercise we can do with management to gauge their knowledge of the safety barriers/controls/safeguards within their business. This PREVENT-PROTECT-MITIGATE model works in both OSH and Process Safety matters and provides a visual structure within which the team can work. Members can download the clean image without the watermark. Line Break gone bad (Stored energy)
On March 1, 2024, a miner died after a metal slurry pipe struck him. The miner was removing the last bolt connecting two metal slurry pipes when the pipe broke free and swung in his direction. Best Practices • Prevent miners from positioning themselves in a manner that will expose them to hazards while performing a task. • Examine work areas before and during the shift for hazards. • Ensure that blocking material is competent, substantial, and adequate to stabilize the load. • Train miners in safe work procedures and hazard recognition. • Monitor personnel routinely to ensure they follow safe work procedures This is the third fatality reported in 2024, and the first classified as “Machinery” CLICK HERE for MSHA Alert The struggle is real! (Metric system vs Imperial system)
This is me doing a Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) with my non-American clients who use the metric system!
PRCS Fatality (O2 Defecient Atm - three attempt rescue)
An Oklahoma City employer’s failure to follow federal safety procedures left a 30-year-old worker suffering fatal asphyxiation as they tried to make repairs inside a water tank at a McClain County well site in September 2023. Responding to the report of a fatality in Purcell, OSHA investigators determined the worker had entered a permit-required confined space to fix a leaking bulkhead valve in a production tank and then lost consciousness. Two co-workers entered the tank in a failed rescue attempt and suffered effects from exposure to low atmospheric conditions—neither sustained injuries. OSHA investigators found that the employer failed to evaluate the tank for hazardous conditions – including testing the atmosphere – and did not use protective systems to prevent worker injuries, violating federal regulations. Further investigation determined the remaining water in the tank contained compounds — including ethyl benzene, xylene, trimethylbenzene, isobutane, and other cyclic aliphatic compounds — and atmospheric readings inside showed low oxygen content, volatile organic compounds, and carbon dioxide, all of which can lead to asphyxiation. OSHA issued 16 serious citations. Of these citations, 13 are related to failures that contributed to the worker’s death, including the following:
PRCS fatality due to LOTO failures (Concrete Mixer(s))
We hear it often... "Who would turn the machine on while I'm working on it?" It happens more often than most think.
Employee # 1 and Coworker #1, Coworker #2, and Coworker #3 were cleaning two (2) concrete mixers. Employee #1 was paired with Coworker #1 to clean out a mixer. Employee #1 entered Mixer #1 and began chipping out the concrete build-up while Coworker #1 removed debris from the outside of the machine. Coworker #2 and Coworker #3 were cleaning out Mixer #2 using the same process. Employee #1 had exited Mixer #1 and was leaning over the opening to retrieve a power tool when Coworker#2 exited the mixer and asked Coworker #3 to bump the blades of Mixer #2 to remove inaccessible concrete. Coworker #3 activated Mixer #1 instead of Mixer #2, and Employee #1 was caught between the rotating blades and the machine's body. Employee #1 was pulled into the machine and was killed due to a near decapitation to the back of the skull and neck, a jaw fracture, and fractures to the left elbow. OSHA abatement plans are about making OSHA happy, but do little to improve overall safety
A former client had an amputation accident, and an OSHA inspection followed, with several citations following that. We were hired to help the company digest all that OSHA found wrong, and there was plenty that OSHA found, but there was even more that OSHA did not see or address with its inspection or citations. The client wanted help with the "abatement plans" to close out the OSHA citations and "put this behind us." Still, they had no interest in understanding what needed to be done outside the "abatement plan" to help reduce the likelihood this same accident would happen again. This happens quite often, and it's a serious problem when we play the "compliance game." OSHA assesses the business's "compliance," usually around particular circumstances. This assessment is based solely on compliance with OSHA's MINIMUM standards. They issue citations, and the company has to "abate" those issues. However, those citations usually do not address the "ROOT CAUSE(S)" of those issues. The facility was cited for: How well does management know the "barriers/controls/safeguards"?
When meeting with executive teams, I like to conduct an exercise to gauge the leadership team's level of knowledge and direct involvement in the safety and health of their employees. Before getting deep into the organization's specific barriers/controls/safeguards regarding their top 3 risks (which the team picks), I ask the team to take 10 minutes and identify the barriers/controls/safeguards in today's vehicles and to place them into the three (3) Layers of Safety. They do this as a single team. It is a fun exercise for any group of employees, and it brings to light the stark difference in the role of a barrier/control/safeguard. Some are intended to PREVENT the accident; some are designed to PROTECT the occupants from the consequences of the accident; and some (not necessarily on the vehicle, so this is a trick question) are intended to MITIGATE the event's severity. Who is the idiot?
We see these silly stickers occasionally in our work with clients. Although they are not official company positions, I am curious as to why they aren't removed from company machinery and equipment. Could this be because management/supervisors believe this to be an accurate statement/belief? But let's talk about the message these silly stickers really convey and to do so, I ask the question: Who is the idiot? The worker asked to operate the piece of machinery/equipment or the Management that hired them to operate the piece of machinery/equipment?
The seven C's
The seven C's of being all we can be as safety professionals.
Compassionate
Confident
Collaborative
Contemplative
Civil
Curious, and
Courageous
Let us remember WHY we became safety professionals AND, more importantly, putting those we have the privilege to protect # 1 in our efforts.
Source: 7 C's of Compassionate Leaders (Forbes)
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Partner Organizations
I am proud to announce that The Chlorine Institute and SAFTENG have extended our"Partners in Safety" agreement for another year (2024) CI Members, send me an e-mail to request your FREE SAFTENG membership
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