EPA's Clean Water Act Hazardous Substance Facility Response Plans
On March 28, 2024, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published its Final Rule: Clean Water Act Hazardous Substance Facility Response Plans (Final Rule), requiring certain facilities to develop Facility Response Plans (FRP) for a worst-case discharge of Clean Water Act (CWA) hazardous substances, or threat of such a discharge. A worst-case discharge is the largest foreseeable discharge in adverse weather conditions, including extreme weather conditions. Facilities subject to the rule must prepare response plans in the event of worst-case discharges or threat of such discharges and submit them to EPA. The Facility Response Plan requirements apply to facilities that could reasonably be expected to cause substantial harm to the environment, based on their location. These include facilities with: Membership Content
Safety Thought of the Week... the systems we design and the choices of humans within those systems
"Most adverse events have their origin in two places:
The resulting harm and the human errors (slips, lapses, and mistakes) that may have caused it are really two forms of outcome—outcomes to be monitored, studied, and perhaps grieved. Systems and choices are where the action is, with culture referring to the choices made within the system.
The first origin of adverse events is system design. Is "Goodhart's Law" a reality in safety metrics?
Goodhart's law says... "When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure." This "law" is often used when denouncing poorly devised safety metrics and/or incentive programs. In most situations where there is a weak/immature Safety Process/SMS, the "law" makes sense; however, this is because, without strong leadership and a functioning Safety Process/SMS, organizations will inevitably and eventually turn "leading indicators" into a "numbers game," just like they turned their lagging indicators into a numbers game to achieve what they defined as "safety success." But there is a simple solution to combat this "law"... VERIFY and VALIDATE our safety metrics and the Safety Process/SMS that produced those metrics!
Let's first understand what I mean by saying, "verify and validate our safety metrics." Merriam-Webster dictionary says:
What does this look like in safety metrics, and how do we use it? We are not alone!
Yesterday, I went to my local mechanic to have my oil changed and my tires rotated. It took me 20 years to find this shop, and they hit a home run every time. But yesterday was quite entertaining, and I could not help but think, "We are not alone" after what I witnessed. A gentleman around my age came into the shop and explained his problem. Now, I am not a mechanic, and I would not even play one on TV, but I know my limitations when diagnosing my vehicle's problem. This gentleman sounded like he was making stuff up. Listening to him mimic the sounds he was hearing and how the vehicle was performing made no sense to the young man behind the counter, so he went to get the boss. The boss/owner is a master mechanic and has been in that shop his entire life, and the customer again went through his story. The owner said they would run a diagnostic test to establish any issues. The customer was adamant that he knew the problem and that the diagnostic test was unnecessary and was a waste of time and money. The owner tried to delicately explain to the customer that what he was describing was not making sense, and they did not know what needed to be done to address his issue(s). The owner eventually asked the customer what he would like them to do to address his problems/concerns. The owner explained they would do X at his request but clarified that he was making NO guarantees that what they would do would fix his issue/concern. As I picked up my truck, the customer was back as well, ranting about their work. This was a waste of time, as the vehicle was still making noises and performing poorly. The owner was standing there trying to explain that he made no guarantees that his diagnosis was correct but insisted X be done to fix the problem. The shop did X, but it did not fix the problem, and the customer was unhappy. All of this over a $110 diagnostic test! It reminds me of people "self-diagnosing" illnesses and trying to tell the Doctor what the problem is and what the Doctor needs to do to remedy the situation. I used to experience this monthly with companies contacting me about helping them with their safety. I would suggest a "diagnostic test" to assess their problems, and they would not be happy. They were confident they knew the problem, which 99.99% of the time would make no sense, and just wanted me to do X. We are not alone! Line Break gone bad (Water Truck)
Line Break is commonly associated with OSHA's Highly Hazardous Chemicals in its PSM standard and EPA's Extremely Hazardous Substances in its RMP rule. But SAFTENG members know I use Line Break Safe Work Practice (SWP) outside the PSM/RMP process battery limits. I apply this SWP to energy sources such as steam and even water when the water is pressurized or heated. I have written several LOTO articles discussing DEFINING and QUANTIFYING "hazardous energy." This tragic event involved water and the "head pressure" generated by water in a tanker truck. On September 28, 2023, Employee #1 assisted with water tank truck filling operations. There were two (2) people involved in the process. Upon noticing an overflow, the pair rushed out to the truck, and a coworker shut off the hydrant while Employee #1 went to the rear of the truck. Once the hydrant was off, Employee #1 released the cam lock on the hydrant hose without first closing the intake valve on the truck. This caused water to exit the port where the 3-inch hose had been unlocked, pressurized by the weight of the water coming through the opening. The force of the water caused Employee #1 to be struck in the head by the hose and fall backward onto the pavement. Employee #1 was killed due to blunt force head injuries. RISK is EVERYWHERE! Examination and Testing of NON-metalic piping systems (ASME B31)
How times have changed in 30 years regarding "materials of construction" in hazardous materials processes. I grew up in process safety, seeing nothing but metallic piping systems; today, I bet I see piping systems made from non-metallic products upwards of 25% of the time. This is becoming increasingly acceptable in one specific process I do a lot of work with, so I can not provide specifics as it could create a trail back to some of my clients. Just know that many of the processes are PSM/RMP-covered processes. ASME B31.3 addresses non-metallic piping systems in Chapter VII, Nonmetallic Piping and Piping Lined With Nonmetals. In this article, I want to discuss Part 10, Inspection, Examination, and Testing of Nonmetallic Piping Systems Used in a PSM/RMP-covered process. For those who are not SAFTENG members, just know that ASME B31.3 requires many of the same examination and testing requirements for nonmetallic piping systems as it does for metallic piping systems. Two (2) very CRTICIAL PROHIBITIONS for non-metallic piping are the SAME as metallic piping:
Here are the other examination and testing requirements for NON-metallic piping systems: Top 5 signs your not managing safety via a SMS
This article applies to BOTH facilities practicing process safety and basic OSH. Many of the facilities will declare they have and utilize a Safety Management System (SMS) in their efforts to manage hazards and risks those hazards pose to workers, the environment, and the business. However, I have developed five (5) simple tests to determine if the facility is managing safety/process safety via an SMS. Please remember that a facility that requires a PSM/RMP management system is REQUIRED to use these tools. Still, over 20+ years of performing PSM/RMP audits, we can conclude that many businesses struggle to meet the management system requirements. [My] Weekly Thought on Safety... give a SMS a chance
In the social media "safety sphere," it is literally impossible to spend five minutes and not be bombarded by all the new approaches to "safety." In many of these new approaches, they will almost unilaterally denounce the traditional approach to safety management and provide case studies to prove their point. Maybe I am just an old dog and can't learn these new tricks, or I have seen what a formal Safety Management System (SMS) can do for an organization and believe in the SIMPLE approach. In these studies, where they debate and attempt to convince me of the need for a new approach (name your choice of the many new approaches), they will usually demonstrate the ups and downs of performance using the older traditional methods, such as a formal SMS. We can all nod in unison as we have all lived this turbulent performance (e.g., OSHA-free last year, only to have three recordables already before April!). But here is what I have noticed over three decades of building SMSs... Very few organizations have a fully functioning SMS, much less a mature SMS. This observation even applies to many organizations mandated to have an SMS because they call under OSHA/EPA process safety standards. So, is it a flawed approach, or is it a lack of dedication to a formal and structured SMS? What am I saying when I sign-off on the first line of my PSSR? (Piping)
Most PSSR forms we encounter simply regurgitate OSHA's 1910.119(i)(2). If the user is thoroughly knowledgeable of what each of these four (4) line items entails, we may be able to execute the PSSR appropriately. Let's look at these four line items, especially the first line.
This single line item, (i)(2)(i), INCLUDES a ton of responsibility, as well as documents/data, to embrace what it is attempting to achieve fully. This line item covers EVERYTHING (physical object) the HHC/EHS touches; however, I will discuss only how it impacts PSM/RMP piping in this article. We see a lot of PSSR in our travels, and almost all of them will have this line item signed off as completed; however, when we ask for piping installation records, we get the "deer in the headlights" look. Here is what a facility should have to sign off on this single PSSR line item properly: ASME B31 Examination vs. Inspection
The two (2) terms sound similar and will conjure up similar images when we hear them, but they are used in the ASME B31 piping standards in very different ways and apply to different groups. To state it very simply, the EXAMINATION is what the owner/operator does to pass the INSPECTION, which is what the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) does. In summary
Examination applies to quality control functions performed by the manufacturer (for components only), fabricator, or erector. Reference in this Code to an examiner It is the owner’s responsibility, exercised through the owner’s Inspector, to verify that all required EXAMINATIONS and TESTING have been completed and to inspect the piping to the extent necessary to be satisfied that it conforms to all applicable EXAMINATION requirements of the Code and of the engineering design. For many of you managing a PSM/RMP covered process, the actual work/requirements of B31.3 are inside the "examination bubble," which is where the heart and soul of the Quality Assurance measures come to life, such as: Safety Thought of the Week... Employee Engagement
The business benefits to be obtained from employee engagement are huge. Studies have shown that (a) where employee engagement was low, companies had 62% more safety incidents (Harter, Schmidt, Killham, & Asplund, 2006); and (b) where employee engagement was high, engaged employees were five times less likely to experience a safety incident, and seven times less likely to have a lost-time safety incident (Lockwood, 2007) than non-engaged employees. Employee engagement is an approach designed to help ensure employees are committed to an entity’s goals and values while motivating people to contribute to that entity’s success. Such entities tend to possess a strong and genuine value for workforce involvement, with clear evidence of a ‘just and fair’ culture (Reason, 1997) based on mutual respect between the entire management structure and the workforce. The key aspect is ensuring an understanding by all concerned that engagement means two-way dialogues that lead to joint decision-making about the best way forward while also acting together to make things happen:
Source: Safety Cultures, Safety Models, Taking Stock and Moving Forward, 2018, Claude Gilbert, Benoît Journé, Hervé Laroche, Corinne Bieder |
Partner Organizations
I am proud to announce that The Chlorine Institute and SAFTENG have extended our"Partners in Safety" agreement for another year (2024) CI Members, send me an e-mail to request your FREE SAFTENG membership
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