In September 2010, a male worker (Victim I), 48, employed by a village Department of Public Works (DPW) and a male volunteer firefighter (Victim II), 51, of the village Fire Department (FD) died after entering a sewer manhole. The manhole was located behind the fire house. The Fire Chief and a firefighter were called in by the DPW general foreman (GF) to unlock the firehouse and move the fire truck so it would not be blocked by the DPW utility truck while working at the manhole. Victim II also arrived to offer assistance. The manhole was five feet in diameter and 18 feet deep with an opening 24 inches in diameter (see photo). Victim I started climbing down the metal rungs on the manhole wall wearing a Tyvek suit and work boots in an attempt to clear a sewer blockage. The DPW GF, the firefighter and Victim II walked over to observe. They saw Victim I lying on the manhole floor motionless. They speculated that he had slipped and fallen off the rungs and injured himself.

A male food production worker, 54, who was employed by a pizza dough manufacturing facility, sustained fatal injuries as a result of deep neck lacerations made by a steel blade on a dough machine. On the day of the incident, the victim and a co-worker were assigned to clean two dough machines, an "elevator" and a "divider". The "elevator" had three major components: a lifting mechanism, a hopper, and a steel blade ("dough chunker") that was located at the bottom of the hopper. The facility's lockout/tagout procedure required an operator to set the control buttons of the "dough chunker" to "Off" and "Manu" before turning off the main power switches. Prior to the incident, the victim turned OFF and locked the power switches, but left the "dough chunker" controls set to "On" and "Auto". 

Two chemical plant operators, 40 and 50, died after suffering burns to their bodies when a runaway reaction caused an explosion of flammable liquids.  The two victims were working in a building which contained several tanks of chemicals.  An employee in an adjacent area reported an ammonia odor coming from the building.  The two victims and their supervisor searched the building and discovered a puffing/venting from a feed tank.  They further determined that a tank (#302) adjacent to the feed tank was heating up.  Tank #302 contained flammable chemicals.  

A boiler maker, 36, suffered fatal burns after an explosion occurred at a refinery. The victim and two injured co-workers were employed by a contractor at the facility. The three were hospitalized as a result of the explosion. The victim died four days later from burns over approximately 90% of his body. The events occurred in the area of the a Flare and Knock-Out (KO) Drum. A 36-inch pipe delivers hydrocarbons from the refinery production area and collects them in the KO Drum. Another 36-inch pipe exits the top of the KO Drum and delivers vapors to be burned at the Flare to relieve pressure from the production area.  The process leading up to the fatality began when, during a turnaround (shut down for maintenance), an environmental project was begun to capture flare gas and re-use it as fuel or feedstock rather than burn the gas in the flare.

Let' not fool ourselves or let the media attempt to fool us!  As safety professionals, we all know that the LACK OF INSPECTION by either OSHA or EPA played NO ROLE in the tragic accident in West, TX.  Just ask yourself this simple question:  How many accident investigations have you conducted and determined that a causal factor in the accident was the lack of OSHA or EPA involvement?  We know that a true "root cause" investigation looks INTERNALLY at our own failures that led to the situation, which allowed the accident to occur.  Although the SFMO and ATF were a bit testy at their news conference last week, we have to understand it is NOT their job to play politics!  They want ROOT CAUSE evidence of the fire's cause and origin and whether the facility followed any safety protocols is NOT part of the cause and origin of the FIRE INVESTIGATION.  This aspect will be left up to the Chemical Safety Board (CSB); however, this week we have learned of some "turf wars" stemming from this investigation!  Let's take a peek inside the investigation and see what could be brewing within...

Since the tragic loss of life in the West Fertilizer explosion, the topic of access to "safety codes/standards" and their "availability" has been brewing underground once again.  But with regards to Ammonium Nitrate (AN) safety, there is NO EXCUSE, as the three (3) MOST reputable safety organizations: 1) NFPA, 2) FM Global, and 3) International Fire/HAZMAT Codes can ALL BE ACCESSED for FREE!  Both NFPA and FM Global require you to register for the FREE access but I have done so for many years and have NEVER received any spam from either organization as a result of my registration.  Here is how ANYONE can get access to these organizations vast safety libraries, which include safety codes/standards for the handling and storage of AN ...

This week at the AIHce 2013 in Montreal, Canada Mr. Michael's had the following to say about the current status and future of OSHA's VPP...

In September 2012, a worker at a "winery" in CA was killed when he opened a valve on a refrigeration chiller, releasing 284 pounds of anhydrous ammonia.  Below is the NRC report from this fatality incident and I have submitted a FOIA to CA-OSHA so that I can obtain their citations and have a better understanding of what happened.

NOTE:  From what I know about this incident, it MAKES A CASE for a "car seal" program in the refrigeration industry.  Often times the idea of such an administrative program is shunned in the refrigeration industry - but this single incident shows just what can happen when only a mere 5 gallons of NH3 is spilled and the worker is unable to escape the area.  We know the worker opened the "wrong valve" from the facility NRC report; a properly applied Car Seal program would/could have indicated to the worker he was at the wrong valve!

Based on a compliance monitoring inspection conducted at the Respondent's facility on August 16, 2012, EPA alleges that the Respondent violated the Act's Chemical Accident Prevention Program, when at the time of inspection, the Respondent did not provide evidence that: