The simple path to implementing SIF

In the world of industrial safety, we are not at a loss for the desire to try new things. Many consulting companies are waiting to sell us their shiny gadgets. One of these latest crazes is called "SIF"—Serious Injuries and Fatalities. The concept behind this model is based on the progress many have made in reducing their recordable injuries of lesser severity; however, the risk of a significant incident may still be present. Take OSHA data, for example; as a nation, we have seen a drastic drop in "OSHA recordable" injuries, but we have not seen the same drop in fatalities. So the thought process is that we need to IDENTIFY those risks that can lead to a serious injury or fatality (SIF) and analyze the controls/barriers/safeguards we have in place AND their real-time ability to PREVENT, PROTECTION, and/or MITIGATE these SIF events.

Most of us are already informally doing SIF. I like to start my clients out with their BIG THREE:

Electrical Safety-Related Work Practices
Lockout
Permit-Required Confined Spaces

I have to say this BEFORE we go any further:

If your organization lacks a formally structured Safety Management System (SMS), the analysis of these three (3) safety efforts may not be pretty. With a formal SMS, the programs and implementation will have been repeatedly audited by 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Party SMEs and should be in excellent condition. However, in my experience, these programs are not audited/field tested regularly; thus, we find many "holes" in their layers of protection. Sometimes, we find the written program(s) is not even implemented!

These BIG THREE risks are present in almost every workplace, so they are a great stepping stone towards introducing the SIF approach to the organization. They pose a risk of serious injuries and fatalities (SIF), and most organizations that have a formal safety and health COMPLIANCE program can identify opportunities to improve the program and its implementation in the plant.

Doing a good old-fashioned audit of the written program(s), training, and implementation will offer a clear path to improving these ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS intended to manage your SIF risks. Don't take the position that "OSHA does not require us to audit these programs", as we are not doing this effort to "comply with OSHA" we are doing it to identify GAPS in our risk controls.

So, if all this talk about SIF has piqued your interest, this simple first step can be an eye-opening experience for management to get a better understanding of what the SIF approach is all about and the detailed look at the controls/barriers/safeguards around their BIG THREE risks. And dare I say it, but all of the BIG THREE have been a "COMPLIANCE" requirement for 30+ years, and maybe it's time we get serious about our first step in industrial safety - meeting the minimum compliance requirements. We can then build on that FOUNDATION and make serious improvements to lower the risks to the men and women who do the dirty and dangerous work.

Identifying scenarios of Situations with a high SIF Potential (SHSP) involves detecting hazards and then evaluating the risks by examining all risks and the severity of their potential consequences, taking into account the prevention measures that are either in place or under consideration.

Each SHSP characterizes a potentially serious or fatal accident scenario based on a risk that is insufficiently covered by the safety management system because the latter is either weakened or poorly designed.

The goal is to accurately identify situations with serious risks if no measures are taken. And yet, not all situations on an industrial site have a high SIF potential. Hazard exposure is therefore important for characterizing an SHSP:

An electrical network or an enclosure containing electrical equipment is not risky in and of itself. But if you are in close proximity—at a distance shorter than the minimum approach distance—or working on one of these, you need to adopt special preventive measures: working only after lockout/tagout (LOTO) or applying the corresponding protocols when performing live work.
In and of itself, a chemical or gas pipe is not a risky structure (subject to the safety case findings). However, special measures must be taken according to the possible exposure of individuals in the immediate vicinity or while working on the pipe. For example: lockout/tagout (LOTO), purge, shutoff... Preventive measures must be elaborated and implemented for the special circumstances in which hazardous material containment is not guaranteed (flammable, toxic, or explosive mixture leak).

Source: The ICSI “Serious Accident Prevention” discussion group. Serious injury and fatality prevention. Issue 2019-05 of the Cahiers de la Sécurité Industrielle collection, Institut pour une Culture de Sécurité Industrielle (ICSI), Toulouse, France. Available as a free download from: http://www.icsi-eu.org/.