Over 12,500 exclusive unsafe acts/conditions and accident/injuries photosand over 1,300 ppt's & doc's from more than 2,797 contributors!
UPDATED the Members Area Photo Library on 4/4/15 with 189 Shocker, Accident, and GRAPHIC Injury photos.
Many THANKS to my NEW and RENEWING "Partners in Safety"
WARNING! This is a CCTV video clip of a worker who is squatting down on an elevated conveyor belt at what looks to be a gravel pit when the conveyor is turned on and he is sucked under a brace. The video may be upsetting to some. There is NO graphic images, but the video will make you a BELIEVER IN LOTO!
EPA RMP General Duty Clause citations @ Coke facility (Flammables; $50K - Failure to maintain desiccant dryer led to explosion)
This is not just another RMP General Duty Clause case. This case centers around a “critical utility” and how its FAILURE led to the release of a flammable gas and explosion. And the critical utility was the plant air system and the critical component was air dryer. The facility had recognized these systems as critical AND had the air dryer on an inspection schedule. Each shift, facility employees inspected the desiccant crystals in the air dryer system to ensure that the desiccant crystals are blue in color, which indicates that the air is dry. Employees then record the results on a checklist. The review of these records revealed that during the time period from January 22, 2014 until the time of the incident, area operators had noted the desiccant's LACK OF blue color on the inspection checklist, but no actions were taken to address this condition. The presence of moisture in the lines in extremely cold temperatures led to the failure of the west flare stack's valve to open due to a frozen air-line.
OSHA’s Process Safety Management Standard is NOT the only standard that requires “verification of knowledge” after training
In the PSM/RMP world, the battle rages on with regards to “verification of knowledge” for those receiving training related to their work in, on and adjacent to a PSM/RMP covered process. Yet for those safety professionals not working at a PSM/RMP facility, you too have a standard, that will just about cover ALL workplaces, that REQUIRES the employer to ensure workers understood the training. That standard is 1910.132(f)(2)...
Period: 30 days, 3/19/15 to 4/18/15
New Inspections: Opened in the last 30 days = 570
Closed Inspections: Closed in the last 30 days = 1,235
Ongoing Inspections: Opened prior to 30 day reporting period and still not closed = 110,342
Inspections with Violations = 129
Inspections with no Violations = 441 (Based on number of New Inspections only)
Assessed Penalties= $0.3M (Assessed Penalties for violations issued under New Inspections only)
On May 24,2012, EPA conducted a compliance inspection of Respondent's facility to determine compliance with the Risk Management Program ("RMP") regulations promulgated at 40 C.F.R. Part 68 under Section 112(r) of the Act. EPA found that the Respondent had violated regulations implementing Section 112(r) of the Act by failing to comply with the regulations. The Alleged Violations And Proposed Penalties are:
EPA RMP General Duty Clause citations @ diesel facility (Flammables; $30K - Piping Corrosion led to failure and VCE)
Respondent produces processes, handles, or stores, among other things, propane, hydrogen. isopentane, pentane, isobutane, and methane, which are all listed at 40 CFR Part 68 as extremely hazardous flammable chemicals. On August 3, 2014, there was a release of flammable substances from piping at the facility and a fire ensued. There were no injuries or fatalities; however, there was significant property damage to the facility's infrastructure. Respondent's investigation revealed that the fire resulted from a hole in process pipping at the facility allowing the release of flammable substances, which subsequently came in contact with an ignition source. The hole resulted from internal corrosion. Respondent failed to design and maintain a safe facility and did not take such necessary steps to prevent accidental releases by allowing internal corrosion on process piping that led to the release and subsequent fire. Respondent's failure constitutes a violation of the general duty clause in section 112(r)(1) of the CAA. Respondent is therefore subject to the assessment of penalties pursuant to sections 113(a)(3) and 113(d)(1)(B) of the CAA for violation of the general duty clause of section 112(r)(1) of the CAA. EPA and Respondent agree that an appropriate penalty to settle this matter is thirty thousand dollars ($30,000). CLICK HERE for the CAFO
A manufacturer of custom-sized resin balls used as flotation devices in the petroleum and fracking industries failed to protect its employees from the risk of death or serious injury from potential fires, explosions and other hazards by not providing and using mandatory safeguards. Officials from OSHA began inspecting the plant in October 2014, in response to complaints. Inspectors identified 48 violations of workplace safety and health standards, resulting in $105,200 in proposed fines. The ball manufacturing process requires the storage and use of up to 1,900 pounds of a flammable formaldehyde solution. In addition, inspectors found the presence of combustible resin dust; flammable liquids improperly stored and transferred; no audible fire alarm and fire-suppression system; and locked and obstructed exit routes.
You spend enough time working on Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) you are bound to come across some crazy situations. Luckily I have some world class clients who not only allow me to share my "interesting finds" but encourage me to share with all of you. This most recent find was at an OSHA VPP STAR site. We have been hired to do program specific audits each quarter, with an emphasis on energy control. This means even though I may be auditing flammable liquids this quarter, I am ALWAYS auditing LOTO and conducting "periodic inspections" (and yes I am an "authorized employee" within their LOTO program - I wrote it, wrote 99% of the machine specific control plans, and still do all the LOTO training at the facility). For the most part this facility KNOWS LOTO and LIVES IT DAILY; but we all have flaws - no one or no facility is perfect. Hence why we need LAYERS of PROTECTION in all our safety efforts. So today I was making my rounds talking with everyone and came across one of the safety committee members who was cleaning a piece of equipment. He knew I was there to do an audit, as he had participated in many audits with me before. He was PROUD and CONFIDENT of his ability to meet all LOTO requirements. But, the good will ended there. Here is the image of his electrical isolation - do you see anything wrong?