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We have become aware that insufficient lubrication may have been applied to the bypass valve assemblies on FireHawk M7XT Air Masks when manufactured. A lack of sufficient lubricant could cause the bypass assembly to become difficult to operate or possibly inoperable. No injuries have been reported. Until your affected units have been serviced as described in this notice, please be aware of any degradation in how easily the bypass valve operates when performing your pre-use functional tests as described in the users’ instructions. If degradation is apparent, that Air Mask should be removed from service until it is corrected. CLICK HERE for the Safety Notice
It is said the short circuit due to to liquid leakage caused the explosion. One worker suffered minor injuries. Yesterday 13:30 Xu, the Yongxing Petrochemical Co., Ltd., Dongguan City, near the entrance of a tanker explosion near instantly turned into a sea of fire. Three staff at about 2 meters high near the operating table jumped off the platform to escape immediately after the explosion. According to reports, the the tanker explosion triggered fire for about half an hour later extinguished, did not result in a greater impact; 3 staff, tanker drivers shoulder abrasions.
Today marks the 1-year Anniversary of "The Back Bay Blaze" where UNSAFE Hot Work Practices claimed the lives of two Boston FF's
Today marks the one-year anniversary of the 2014 Boston Brownstone fire that claimed the lives of two Boston firefighters, Lt. Edward Walsh and Michael Kennedy. The fire was found to have started from welding that took place on a metal handrail in a unit next door. The 2014 fire was a nine-alarm fire that took place on March 26, 2014 at 2:42 p.m. in a four-story brick row house at 298 Beacon Street in the Back Bay of Boston. The fire also injured eighteen others, including thirteen firefighters. The fire was believed to have been started by welders working at a nearby iron railing. On June 9, 2014, a report was released concluding that Walsh and Kennedy's deaths were both accidental. On April 4, a number of fire officials, including Boston Fire Commissioner John Hasson, blamed the fire on sparks originating from welding being done on a nearby iron railing. The welders, according to these officials, were operating without a permit and apparently tried to warn others after the fire started. However, the welders did not call 911, which prompted Ken Donnelly and other Massachusetts politicians to call for criminal charges to be brought against the welding company.
Respondent operates a "stationary source" that has an RMProgram covered process, ammonia refrigeration, which stores or otherwise uses anhydrous ammonia, in an amount exceeding its applicable threshold of 10,000 pounds. Respondent has submitted and registered an RMPlan to the EPA for the stationary source. Respondent has developed an RMProgram accidental release prevention program for the stationary source. Based on an RMProgram compliance monitoring investigation initiated on August 21, 2013, the EPA alleges that the Respondent violated the codified rules governing the CAA Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, because Respondent did not adequately implement provisions of 40 CFR Part 68 when it:
A Pressure Vessel subject to Internal Corrosion shall be defined as any metal Pressure Vessel using a process product that can cause Corrosion, Erosion, Pitting, Cracking, or Deterioration, as defined in Part 2, 3.3 of the National Board Inspection Code. The intent is to verify the vessel is safe to operate. Pressure Vessels subject to internal corrosion shall receive a Certificate Inspection every three (3) years. Owner-Users qualified in accordance with Section 15 of the Illinois Boiler & Pressure Vessel Safety Act (430 ILCS 75) shall have the option of using API-510 or the NBIC for inspection intervals. This inspection shall be external and internal where conditions permit,* however, small air receivers and domestic hot water supply storage vessels, or vessels without man-way openings, may substitute thickness readings compared to original material thickness values when internal inspection is impractical. CLICK HERE (pdf) to see this DRAFT Document.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to strengthen security at the Nation’s high-risk chemical facilities through the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. Chemical Security Program Statistics as of March 2, 2015:
CLICK HERE (pdf) for the DHS press release