Just two weeks ago we lost a dozen firefighters and speculation is there was no formal Incident Command set-up/communicated in the response (based on radio traffic from the scene and responders).  Here is another SIGNIFCANT INCIDENT involving a FULL Anhydrous Ammonia (NH3) tanker truck being struck by a train.  Note the appartus placement of the responding agencies at an ACTIVE RELEASE scene!  We can see ammonia vapor within the water fog pattern that is being used to "scrub" the vapors (just behind the red tractor).  This is NOT advanced training, but basics of setting up a HOT, WARM, COLD zone based on the material(s) and quantity(s) involved in the incident.  It amazes me that just weeks after we lost our brothers in TX that every single FD has not had a stand-down to discuss scene management, reviewing Tier II reports, IC role in ALL responses, etc. to ensure that our responders SAFETY IS #1!  I am sorry, but this response is just unacceptable, regardless of the events in West, TX.  There are many that will claim I need to shut up as I was not there and "just don't understand what was going on"!  So be it, but when the most basic ERG material calls for an intial isolation distance of 500' for large spill (even 100' if you want to call this a "small spill") and take a look at the appratus placement.  I also like the Level of PPE the gentleman is wearing!!! Just baffling!  Here is a news source for the incident.

OSHA has cited the propane facility with 21 serious violations following a November 2012 fire that required three workers to be hospitalized and four workers to be treated and released. The plant inspection was expanded to include the national emphasis program on Process Safety Management Covered Chemical Facilities. Proposed penalties total $105,000.  The serious violations cited under the process safety management (PSM) standard include: failing to compile process safety information for safety systems, such as emergency shutdowns; ensure equipment complies with recognized and good engineering practices, such as relief systems; address various elements of a process safety hazards analysis, including the use of a methodology appropriate to the complexity of the process, human factors, facility siting and addressing action items or recommendations in a timely manner; inspect and test equipment, including vessels and piping and identify safeguards; and perform the lockout/tagout of equipment and processes and provide training for employees in the use of lockout/tagout.  Here is breakdown of the citations: 

With the recent catstrophe/tragedy in West, TX the politicians have been none stop in calling for more regulations to stop another such accident.  I have become senical in my aging process and have just about come to the conclusion that NO LAW can fully prevent another such tragedy; especially one written by lawyers in Washington, DC!  But the one common question that is being asked is "How did so many homes, schools, and care facilities come to be built in such close proximity to such a facility"?  It is a great question and the answer to which will play a major contributing factor in this accident.  But we are not the first nation to be faced with this question and our friends "across the pond" have already paved a path for us to follow... if we are so bold to as actually take action to protect communities.  In the U.K. they call it "Land Use Planning" (LUP) and they even have software that community leaders can use to examine the risk of allowing a "high risk industry" into a community or allowing a community to develop in the shadow of a high risk facilty.  They call this PADHI (planning advice for developments near hazardous installations) and it is the name given to the methodology and software decision support tool developed and used in HSE. It is used to give land use planning (LUP) advice on proposed developments near hazardous installations. During 2006/07, the software decision-support tool, known as PADHI+, was provided to planning authorities (PAs) to enable them to consult HSE for advice online.

The International Fire Code (IFC) is in use or adopted in 43 states, the District of Columbia, NYC, Guam and Puerto Rico.  To dig deeper and find out if your "Authority having Jurisdication" (AHJ) can enfore the IFC - CLICK HERE (pdf).

EPA inspected a food distribution warehouse in October 2012 that contained an ammonia refrigeration process.  The inspection found the following issues:

OSHA has cited dairy food company with 10 serious, two repeat and two other-than-serious violations. OSHA began an inspection in November 2012 under its Site Specific Targeting Program that directs enforcement resources to high-hazard workplaces, where high injury and illness rates occur, and the National Emphasis Program on facilities, covered under the Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals. The serious violations of the process safety management standard include: 

This AFPM Process Safety Bulletin is a communication of the AFPM event sharing program. Bulletins are intended to communicate causal factors and lessons learned from API RP 754 Tier 1 and Tier 2 process safety events (PSE), as well as PSEs judged to have high learning value, and to notify industry of hazards and circumstances that may potentially lead to a process safety event. This Process Safety Bulletin does not constitute legal or technical advice or recommendations of any kind, nor does it alter any legal requirements. Although care has been taken to provide accurate information, AFPM makes no express or implied representations or warranties, including without limitation fitness for a specific purpose or compliance with applicable laws, concerning the information contained in this Process Safety Bulletin.