A chemical plant where chlorine is manufactured suffered a Vertical Pressure Vessel BLEVE, at least from video footage it appears to be a BLEVE. It involved a vertical tank, as can been seen in this video, as well as a flammable Liquified Pressurized Gas, as evident when the vessel lands. Hopefully, we will learn more in the next few days.
Respondent owned and operated a pesticide and specialty chemical manufacturing facility located in Louisiana. On January 8, 2014, EPA Region 6 conducted an on-site CAA 40 C.F.R. Part 68 and Section 112(r) Partial Compliance Evaluation of the Facility. The facility has 11 regulated substances that are held above the threshold quantities identified in 40 C.F.R.§ 68.130. During a maintenance outage, Respondent installed a blind flange on a column stripper as an intended in-kind replacement. The blind flange corroded, causing a release of2.2 pounds of chlorine and 0.22 pounds of cyanogen chloride. Later analysis showed that the installed blind flange was made of carbon steel rather than titanium, which caused the corrosion and release. Here's what EPA found:
Clarifications to CPL 02-02-079, Inspection Procedures for the Hazard Communication Standard (HCS 2012)
This memorandum provides information on issues raised since the publication of the Inspection Procedures for the Hazard Communication Standard (HCS 2012) compliance directive, CPL 02-02-079. This memo serves primarily to assist the field staff in clarifying the requirements of HCS 2012. OSHA clarifies the following questions:
Respondent owns and operates a facility in Houston, Texas. The Facility processes, handles, and/or stores regulated substances and other extremely hazardous substances, including ethylene and ethylene oxide. The Facility has a number of laboratory and pilot plant processes, including a Reversible Acid Pretreatment Pilot Plant (RAPT PP) and an Ethylene Oxide Pilot Plant (EOPP). On February 15, 2016, Respondent attached the RAPT PP to the emergency flare gas (EFG) header, a waste gas collection system. Respondent previously conducted a purge activity of vessels in the RAPT PP in preparation for commissioning and had left two bleeder valves open on that pilot process. These valves were not closed prior to connecting the RAPT PP to the EFG.
NOTE: this is another situation where a "car-seal" program may have prevented an accident.
At approximately 10:15 a.m. on May 30, 2012 a 46-year-old truck driver was making a routine delivery of sanitation chemicals to a milk packaging plant. The plant purchases their sanitation chemicals through a nationally recognized clean-in-place chemical provider and the chemicals are delivered by a local chemical trucking company. Employee #1 (truck driver) delivered the chemicals to the plant's milk-loading dock #2 where the chemicals are pumped through receiving pipes located on the south wall of the loading dock. The pipes lead to three large tanks located in the Clean In- Place (CIP) room located adjacent to the dock. The multi-compartment tanker truck was loaded with two (2) different chemicals:
Here is a look at OSHA's Permit-Required Confined Space (PRCS) compliance activity in 2016 (October 2015 - September 2016). As you can see, OSHA did 192 PRCS inspections (↓) and issued 435 citations (↓) for a total of $1,285,302 in fines (↓). 2015 numbers were 206 inspections; 545 citations; and $1,435,301. This is the SETTLED amount and NOT the initial citations. Here is a quick breakdown of activity:
Union Pacific railroad worker killed by train near Wallula (worker, 54, was killed by a train at 5:30 a.m. along the railroad track - no other details)
CRUSHED Worker killed in apparent accident at Manning Supply (worker, 57, was crushed and killed while handling large panel doors on the company’s lot -several workers were transferring building materials, including the doors, from one semi-trailer to another - during the process, several doors shifted, striking the victim and pinning him against the wall of the trailer)
ELECTRICAL 1 electric worker killed, 1 hurt during East Texas repairs (one electric worker has died and another was hurt after being shocked while repairing downed power lines after a traffic accident - two contract workers were dispatched to do repairs when both were accidentally shocked - the victims were transported to a hospital, where one was declared dead and the other was treated for serious injuries)
FORKLIFT FATALITY Worker killed in forklift mishap at FDNY parts depot (worker was killed when he became pinned between a forklift and a delivery truck when he put the forklift in neutral and placed it next to his van - when he left the heavy machinery to retrieve something from the van, the forklift somehow started rolling, crushing him between the van and the forklift - cops responding to the scene at 12:35 p.m. found the man unconscious and unresponsive - EMS brought him to a Hospital, where he was pronounced dead)
IFS Coatings is a leader in the production of high performance powder coatings based in Gainesville, Texas. We strive to be the best supplier of high performance powder coatings meeting the specialty needs of industry with speed, integrity and responsibility to our employees, customers and communities in which we exist.
Other duties include but are not limited to; conducting employee and subcontractor site safety orientations as well as oversee training programs, work with all levels of the organization to implement HSE guidelines, participate in safety meetings and track incident statistics timely and appropriately.
This is not the first time I have addressed this matter, but somehow, somewhere a dirty little lie has been circulating among ammonia design and installation contractors that somehow an engineroom handling less than 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia (NH3) is incapable of presenting an explosion hazard, thus no need for any engineered ventilation. This is insane logic and not anywhere near a rational risk analysis! The 10,000 pounds comes from the PSM (and RMP) threshold and has ZERO to do with potential explosion hazards from Ammonia. We could have 3,000 pounds in our system, not be covered by PSM, and yet blow up our engine/machinery room. OSHA does not even have to use their "General Duty Clause" to cite a non-ventilated engineroom that is not built to a Class I, Div 2, Group D HAZLOC. And to be perfectly clear, the "exemption" that allows an ammonia refeirgeration engineroom from being a HAZLOC is found in NFPA 70, NOT OSHA; however, OSHA has had a long standing position on this matter since 1990 (two years BEFORE the PSM standard!). Case in point...